and those that violate the law? Does evolutionary theory play a part? Should we think of international law not as a set of background rules but as an active player in the game of international relations? Can an active player insist upon its own observance?
This Chapter is a set of inferences to the best explanation of the bindingness of international law. It undoubtedly falls short of explaining international law-a task cheerfully vouchsafed to future researchers. The inferences here are presented as a set of numbered propositions called an apory. 
I. International Rules Are Derived from Dispute Resolution
(1) Conditions favorable to the rise of international law include the existence of several self-contained political entities ("states") each claiming exclusive sovereignty over its own territory and respecting the internal sovereignty of the other states.
(2) When in their foreign relations the states begin to interact and sometimes clash, the rules they eventually settle upon to resolve their controversies form a kind of "common law" of dispute resolution that consists of precedents for averting or handling future disputes.
(3) States often employ a treaty that sets forth agreed-upon rules for the avoidance or resolution of anticipated disputes.
(4) We will call the aggregate of states the international legal system ("ILS"). The ILS acting over time in its own self-interest embraces rules that avoid or peaceably settle disputes among the states, while discouraging the alleged rules that would lead to greater friction or an escalation of the inter-state disputes.
(5) The ILS attaches the label "international law" to rules that reduce disruption among individual states or to rules that restore international equilibrium.
This foregoing account does not explain the strong normative force of rules generated by the ILS. So far they only amount to "lessons from history"; that is, suggestions (formulated as rules) for friendly (or at least efficient) conflict resolution. What is required for a set of rules to have a strong normative force is recognition that they constitute binding law.
This normative force does not arise simply from the practice of states, for it would be a Humean fallacy to derive norms from facts. Yet the practice of states is all we have to work with. This Chapter will suggest that there is a way of looking at the practice of states so as to infer a universal norm (the norm that the legal system ought to survive).
There is no world legislature superior to the states that controls the content of international law. One reason there is no such body is the fear that it would favor some states or coalitions (the most powerful?) and disfavor others. that it has more to gain in the short run by (its likelihood of) winning the war than it stands to lose in the long run because of (its share of) deadweight losses.
Incidentally, the formula holds even if one state completely absorbs another: There is no higher source of international law than the aggregate of states. Therefore the aggregate cannot act illegally:
(11) If an individual state acts contrary to a rule of international law, its behavior is deemed (by the aggregate of states) to be lawless .
(12) If all the states in the world suddenly act contrary to a rule of international law, their behavior will be deemed by themselves as lawful. In effect the aggregate of states will have changed the rule by unopposed consensus.
II. Deriving an Ought from an Is
The argument so far may be summarized as follows. In order for international law to be more than an existential fact, its content must serve (promote, facilitate) the interests of the aggregate of states. The two primary interests of the aggregate of states are the avoidance of war among states and the facilitation of trade among states. Whether a given alleged rule of international law is actually a valid rule of international law depends on whether its content promotes either or both of these primary interests of the aggregate of states. Thus the normative force of law derives from its factual coherence with the two primary interests. Since war and trade are both facts, we seem to have produced a norm from a fact.
But not quite. We are assuming that states desire to be rational-that they want to avoid war and promote trade because of the gains in security and welfare that will accrue to them. But suppose states behave randomly. Were Nero, Napoleon, and Hitler rational leaders? (That is, other than in their own minds.) More fundamentally, how is it warranted to attribute any emotion to a state? A state is an artificial concept; the words "rational" and "irrational" do not apply to territory.
Soft Law
An inventive way to deal with the fact/norm problem is to attack it in reverse. Instead of starting with state practice, start with norms. These norms can then-somehow-inform or even shape what states do. Of all the sciences and disciplines, law is the most ideally suited to proceed from norms to facts. The norms can cut a swath through the most stubborn facts. For if the facts prove recalcitrant, they can always be declared illegal on the ground of failure to conform to the norms.
Thus we are left with only conforming facts. By beginning with a basket of norms, we can say that in every case the facts either meet up with friendly norms and are accepted or they encounter unfriendly norms and are banished from the evidentiary pool. Scientists would surely appreciate such a tidy world where every piece of factual evidence either supports the theory (norm) or else doesn't count.
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Soft law, as the term is used in international law, can roughly be described as an incorporal rule.
It is rule without sanction; mind without body; essence without being; precatory but not obligatory. Soft law has especial appeal to writers who claim that international law is unenforceable. In the earlier chapter by Samantha Besson, soft law is often treated as if there were no hard law around to compete with it. This approach forces us to come to grips with what the world would look like if all its law were soft.
The main problem in such a world is that it would be overcrowded with soft law. Unless there were a mechanism for accepting some norms and rejecting others, the world would be beset with contradictory norms. justice, morality, human dignity, well-being, co-existence, cooperation, pluralism, and democracy, the reader might ask how any of these goals would be furthered by looking the other way while a government proceeds in a campaign of genocide against groups of persons within its own territory. A barrier to external intervention in such a case is equivalent to letting the genocide proceed unabated.
Democratic Values
Perhaps the only remaining way to avoid perverse or unintended consequences like the genocide example would be to construct the filter out of the very goals that advocates of soft law wish to achieve. This might sound circular: let the Ends cause the Means so that the Means may cause the Ends. However, unlike the cart-before-the-horse aphorism, a convincing justification by Charles
Taylor for inverting the Means-Ends relationship points to its utility here. 10 Taylor argues that whenever a sentient animal engages in a purposive activity, the purpose causes the activity. For example, a person who desires to go to a restaurant a block away will walk in that direction. It is the image or picture of the restaurant in her mind that causes her to move her body toward the restaurant. Thus in human action the goal comes before the means.
Allen Buchanan, a contributor to the present book, wrote an earlier essay proposing that a filter (he did not use that term) could be constructed that would only allow passage to norms that are conducive to achieving justice, morality, and democracy. 11 Constructing such a filter would surely be a gargantuan task; the filter would have to pre-identify norms that have a built-in tendency to promote justice and democracy. But on the theoretical level, one might agree with Such a wholesale rearrangement of the power and wealth relationships among states would be morally required as well as serving to bring the system closer to the ideal of the rule of law.
Although Buchanan does not necessarily favor illegal transformations to achieve democracy, 13 his vision would take a world revolution to achieve. Nations are not going to relinquish their wealth, resources, and power, just to satisfy an academic demonstration that justice requires it.
People whose homes provide ample room for themselves are not going to willingly invite poorer families from other countries to move in with them and share their rooms and facilities. 
III. Evolution
The discussion of soft law has suggested that the difficulty of using posited norms to force coherence upon a random collection of facts does not work as a way of constructing a bridge between facts and values. Accordingly, we resume the previous thread; in sum:
(13) rationality → avoid war → promote trade → recognize international law as binding But rationality does not work even if we could posit it as a basic hypothesis. Many wars have been started for reasons that seemed rational to the leaders even if the same reasons were later judged by historians to be irrational. Although wars are on the average net losers, in some individual cases they might be a rational strategy for one of the sides. Nor is this pessimism ameliorated if we skip over the political leaders and consider the state itself as the entity that decides on war or peace. For as we have seen there is simply no warrant for attributing a mental process like rationality to the configuration of mountains, lakes, valleys, and plains that constitutes a state.
However, a saving argument can be made. First, the aggregate of states constitutes a complex, self-regulating system. Second, this system functions as if to perpetuate itself through time. Third, to accomplish self-perpetuation, the system must invalidate rules that lead to war and accept rules that characterize the processes of successful dispute resolution.This process was sketchily introduced in proposition (1) above.
(14) States are sufficiently interconnected so as to constitute a system.
A system consists of elements such that a change in one produces a change in all. States create international law, are subject to it, and regard their national interests as implicated whenever other states act so as to violate or appear to violate any rules of international law. It is handy though not necessary to call the aggregate of states a system. The international legal system ("ILS") is complex, self-referential, adaptive, and purposive; it seeks above all its own survival. Not all of these characteristics are important for present purposes, and in any event have been examined elsewhere. 15
Two Strategies of Self-Perpetuation
From its beginnings in Mesopotamia in 2.000 B.C., the ILS has persisted to the present day 16 by two strategies that are common to most complex self-adaptive systems. First, it has fashioned the rules of international law to be overweighed in its own self-interest. The most obvious example is the grudging allowance for the rights of persons. States reluctantly accepted the idea of nationality, but insisted from the outset upon a one-way street: a nation was free to protect its nationals abroad, but a national abroad had no right of protection from his home state. If we view the ILS in evolutionary terms, it is clear that over time it has adjusted and modified its internal rules (the analogy to a plant or animal is a benign mutation) to protect itself against the forces of anarchy. Inasmuch as any war can escalate and spread out¸ anarchy is the greatest fear of the ILS.
Prior to the twentieth century, the ILS was not strong enough to outlaw the resort to war, so it adopted rules that partially accommodated wars and partially constrained them. Peace treaties were favored even though signed under conditions of duress: a treaty that stopped the fighting was always considered by the ILS as preferable to continuation of the war no matter how onerous its terms. Similarly, by the time of the U.S. civil war, rules evolved for the humane treatment of prisoners of war. These rules were sharply disfavored by the generals and officers of the Routledge, 2008) . 16 During the Roman Empire, proposition (1) did not hold; international law was suspended.
combatants, but the global interest of the ILS in reducing the deadweight damages of war gave international legal stature to the scholars who compiled these rules.
(15) One of the system's strategies for perpetuating itself is to adopt rules that reflect the aggregate interests of the states.
The ILS's second strategy for self-protection was to use the rules of international law to modify its environment. Birds build nests; beavers build dams; and people build houses. These activities interfere with the natural environment and greatly increase the entity's chances of survival. The ILS, of course, can only output rules; it has no material substance. But its rules can reconfigure the environment to make it more supportive of further rules (the more rules, the more business the ILS has to do). The first rule of international law-that a state's territory is defined by its boundaries-had a huge impact in paving the way for additional rules. Consider that the earliest Hittite kingdoms were dotted across Mesopotamia. As their populations grew, radial expansion led the outer edges of these kingdoms to run up against nearby kingdoms which were going through the same process of expansion. This led to countless wars for land rights between any given two kingdoms whose outer edges intersected with each other. The clashes abated greatly when borders were drawn or natural boundaries (rivers, valleys) were adopted. Then it was possible to create additional rules that reduced the incidence of warfare: rights of envoys, ambassadorial immunity, sanctity of treaties, effluvial rights when a river was a boundary, and so forth. The more subjects that are regulated by law, the more that the rule of law gains in normative power.
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(16) A second strategy for the system's self-perpetuation is to use rules to modify the environment so that it becomes increasingly amenable to the rule of law.
17 As Oscar Wilde remarked, "Nothing succeeds like excess."
The Drive for Self-Perpetuation
The animal and plant species living today are those that have succeeded in the struggle for survival (over 99% of all Earth's species are extinct.) They have evolved body organs and sensory apparatus that, mutation upon mutation, have added to their fitness. Recent studies of evolution go further in suggesting that many of our deepest ideas and most innate drives are themselves the product of evolution. Their job is to coordinate all the body's powers and functions in the "fight or flight" response against natural predators and in the more routine practices of hiding and camouflage. Entities that develop a stronger mental drive for survival become those entities that are more likely to survive. Hence we can look upon an elephant's drive for survival and characterize it both as a fact about the elephant and a value for the elephant. If we turn our attention inward, we can plausibly say that the value we attach to survival is also a plain fact about ourselves and how we have evolved.
In 1973 two Chilean microbiologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela introduced the idea of autopoiesis-a mechanical system sufficiently complex to regenerate and realize its own network of processes that produced them. 18 An autopoietic system will modify its internal mechanisms and modify its external environment if necessary to perpetuate itself over time.
Maturana and Valera suggested that there was no visible difference between such a system and a living biological entity.
If we combine autopoiesis and the previous argument that the drive for survival is an evolved fitness characteristic, it is no additional stretch to conclude that the goal of the ILS is to survive. This is both a fact about the ILS and a value that the ILS has.
18 Humberto Maturana & Francisco Verala, Autopoiesis and Cognition (1973) .
The Value of Survival
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(17) The aggregate of states has an interest in the survival of the ILS because its survival means that the rule of law is working.
(18) The aggregate of states has an interest in the continued working of the rule of law because it creates and maintains conditions conducive to the avoidance of war (by setting up peaceful conflict-resolution rules and procedures) and to the stimulation of international trade.
(19) At any given point in time, the rules of international law exactly express the interests of the aggregate of states. See also proposition (4).
For all the preceding reasons, we can expect the ILS to use its influence on the A v. B controversy. We can expect the ILS to weigh in on the controversy according to the following hierarchical order:
1. Favor the side that would depart the least from existing international law.
2. Favor the side whose position would tend to reduce future complications. (1961) . His identification of survival as the paramount value is prescient and valuable for the present argument. However, his particular thesis that morality stems from survival is not followed here for two reasons. First, although an autopoietic system can strive to perpetuate itself, there is nothing necessarily "moral" about doing so. Second, if a person could save his own life by pressing a button that would destroy fifty million people including his family, Hart's thesis would suggest that the person would be doing the morally right thing by pressing the button.
